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principles of historical, ethical, and psychological investigation. Discussions of this character should commend the book to workers in these departments, and to others who are primarily interested in the practical applications of logic, rather than in the philosophical theory.

Review will follow.

J. E. C.

The Elements of Ethics. By JAMES H. HYSLOP, Ph.D. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. — pp. vii, 467.

In this work the author has attempted only to deal with the theoretical problems of Ethics. The method employed is a careful analysis of its fundamental conceptions and theories. As an introduction to the questions of present day interest, the second chapter is occupied with the history and development of ethical philosophy from the time preceding Socrates to the close of the period represented by Hume in England and Kant in Germany, only representative men being chosen for the purpose. We thus ascertain the large number of problems that have slowly accumulated in the progress of ethical speculation. The third chapter points out how ethical questions are affected, first, by the various conceptions entertained respecting such terms as virtue, good, right and duty, and, second, by confusion as to the nature of the motives to morality. Under this last topic a careful discussion is given respecting impulse, instinct, and reason, with a view to getting some general meaning for them which will be consistent and useful. In common usage the first two fluctuate between conscious and unconscious influences. This position must be abandoned if the terms are to have any place in morality, which must necessarily be purposive. Hence impulse is treated as a tendency to adjustment with the changes of environment, and so is irregular; instinct, as an organic tendency to action, requiring a fixed environment for its adjustment; and reason as adjustment to both the fixed and changing elements of environment. Impulse and instinct, as unconscious forces, are excluded from consideration.

The fourth chapter discusses at considerable length the freedom of the will, and is based, first, upon a radical distinction between freedom and responsibility, and, second, upon three distinct conceptions of freedom, namely, liberty or physico-political freedom (exemption from external restraint), spontaneity or subjective causation, and velleity or the capacity for alternative choice. The latter is the only real problem in the question, but in the controversy is often confused with the others. The object of the whole discussion is to secure a basis for corrective punishment as distinct from prevention, and to show the limitations to be placed upon responsibility while freedom (velleity) may remain intact.

The subject of conscience is treated in two ways. The *nature* and the *origin* of it are separated from each other as different problems. The position taken in the first question is that conscience is not any unique or simple function of the mind, but simply the whole mind occupied about a certain

object. It differs from the organ of knowledge only by its contents, and not in the kind of mental elements concerned. This enables us to discuss its evolution without considering it a simple function unique in kind, and thus asserting with Spencer that it is evolved out of that which contains none of it. The theories of morality are discussed with reference to a reconciliation of those which are most directly opposed to each other. The relation of religion and morality is stated so as to distinguish between the *ground* and the *sanctions* of the latter, religion being one of the sanctions of morality, but not its ground. The chapter on rights and duties endeavors to obtain an ethical basis for rights, so that duty will not be a mere correlate of that which does not imply an obligation in the subject other than the rights of neighbors.

AUTHOR.

Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and Processes.

By JAMES MARK BALDWIN, M.A., Ph.D. New York and London, Macmillan & Co., 1895. — pp. ix, 488.

In writing this book I have had rather conflicting aims. It was begun as a series of articles reporting observations on infants, published in part in the journal *Science*, 1890–1892. In the prosecution of this purpose, however, I found it necessary constantly to enlarge my scope for the entertainment of a widened genetic view. This came to clearer consciousness in the treatment of the child's imitations, especially when I came to the relation of imitation to volition, as treated in my paper before the London Congress of Experimental Psychology in 1892. The farther study of this subject brought what was to me such a revelation of the genetic function of imitation that I then determined—under the inspiration, also, of the small group of writers lately treating the subject—to work out a theory of mental development in the child, incorporating this new insight.

This occupied my thought, and was made the topic of my graduate *Seminar* in psychology at Princeton, in 1893–94, the result being the conviction that no consistent view of mental development in the individual could possibly be reached without a doctrine of the race development of consciousness. . . .

My final arrangement of chapters presents, when a patient reader is in front of the page, a fair degree of reason, I think. The earliest chapters (I to VI) are devoted to the statement of the genetic problem, with reports of the facts of infant life and the methods of investigating them, and the mere teasing out of the strings of law on which the facts are beaded—the principles of Suggestion, Habit, Accommodation, etc. These chapters have their own end as well, giving researches of some value, possibly, for psychology and education. They serve their purpose also in the progress of the book, as giving a statement of the central problem of motor adaptation. Chapter V gives a detailed analysis of one voluntary function, Handwriting. Then follows the theory of adaptation, stated in general terms in Chapters